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Abstract
During the mid to late 1900s many Latin American countries found themselves under the rule of
violent military regimes and in civil war. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the atrocities
committed in the late 20th century throughout Latin America and to discuss the ways in which
these societies, affected by state violence, were able to overcome the past. In this paper, I will
look at the purpose of truth and reconciliation commissions and their outcomes in Chile,
Argentina, and Guatemala in order to find some similarities and compare and contrast the
successes and failures of the different commissions in their respective settings.
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Introduction
The idea of human rights… is a social construct which reflects social acknowledgements of
individual and communal basic and perceived needs in a particular historical period. In short,
human rights are statements of needs. Of all species of the animal kingdom humans appear the
most vulnerable. The susceptibility of humans to succumb to illness and misfortunes is a prime
reason that the social construct of “human rights” is necessary. 1

Humans are susceptible to nature, but the greatest threat to the well-being of a
human is another one. Human history is plagued with murder, war and violent
repressions by individuals in positions of power. These individuals out of spite, out of a
sense of superiority, out of a sense of duty, feel that they are entitled to do what they do
because of the power that they wield. Many will argue that the reasons for which
atrocities happen are complex and nuanced but regardless of the reasons, the violations of
human rights are a crime against humanity. We as members of democratically elected
represented societies expect that those to whom we yield power will act in accordance
with our individual interests and preferences, after all they are supposed to represent
society. But when those democratically elected members of society engage in activities
that repress and discriminate against individuals’ personal human rights, how is it that we
go about holding those individuals accountable? And when the wielders of power go
even further as to murder innocent civilians in an organized systematic means using the
resources of the state, a state that has been entrusted with the monopoly of violence, a
state that is comprised of the very same victims, what is it that those victims can do?
When the regime comes to an end, what is the role of society and how should it engage

1
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with those responsible for crimes against humanity? What should the leaders of the
society that gain power following the morally corrupt regime focus on, should they focus
on ensuring that the society achieve peace and stability even at the expense of justice for
the victims of the regime? Numerous countries throughout Latin America have directly
dealt with this question of overcoming dictatorial regimes.
James Monroe in 1823 issued the Monroe Doctrine that established that the
European countries, primarily, should stay out of the American continents. This doctrine
would outline the attitude of the United States towards its neighbors in the American
continents by further implying that European countries who meddled with independent
countries in the Americas would be viewed as unfriendly by the United States. In the mid
to late 1900s in the midst of the cold war the United States launched a campaign of
destabilizing democratically elected regimes throughout Latin America attempting to
secure its own interests in its backyard. Additionally, the United States following the end
of WWII, engaged in activities around the world aimed at preventing the spread of
communism and so it established the Army School of the Americas. Through this
institution the United States provided training and anti-communist indoctrination to Latin
American military personnel, some of whom would go on to participate, even lead, coups
that resulted in civil-military control of Latin American countries. However, the United
States would also engage more directly in the politics of Latin America by funding coups
and providing strategic support for covert activities. The military dictatorships that came
to power would go on to murder, forcefully disappear and brutally torture in
unimaginable ways those that the regime viewed as a threat. But in the aftermath of the
brutality, when the country had lived through years of violence and psychological fear
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and instability, how was the country to move forward? These countries in transition were
at a crossroads, they had to decide how to offer compensation and justice for the victims
and the family members of the victims without causing more instability. The transitional
governments had to deal with the fact that those who were responsible for unthinkable
violations to human rights would never agree to be prosecuted for their actions and would
do their best to avoid being held accountable. But before the transitional governments
could know what they should do they had to find the truth, the truth that had been hidden
for the years of the dictatorships because the truth in the periods of dictatorships was the
truth that the dictatorship wanted the people to know. So how could a transitional
government justify actions, even know what to do if they didn’t know the full truth. In
recent years, countries following periods of atrocities have as common practice
established truth and reconciliation commissions in order to investigate the crimes and to
try to identify those who have been hurt.
However, the specific purposes of the truth and reconciliation commissions vary
and they vary because of the differing opinion as to how far the truth commissions should
go in establishing blame if there should be any established at all by the government
commissioned investigation. Should countries’ commissions be focused on redistributive
justice or retributive justice?

Methodology and Purpose
This paper has a primary goal to evaluate and compare three different cases of
truth and reconciliation committees and highlight the strengths of each of the
commissions. This study in particular will analyze the cases of Chile, Argentina, and
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Guatemala and the reports published by the truth commissions in those countries. The
three cases will be compared on three different areas. Firstly, what degree of blame is
expressed in the different commission reports. Additionally, did the degree of blame
outlined in the report influence in the retributive justice against the perpetrators of mass
atrocities? Were the victims and the victims’ families given an avenue or the support in
order to bring the perpetuators to justice? Secondly, what recommendations were made in
the report in regard to the compensation of the victims and the victims’ families?
Furthermore, on the same question, what sort of policies have been carried out and how
have they been received by the specific countries? Finally, what policies were
recommended by these truth commissions in order to prevent the violation of human
rights in the future? To answer these questions, the paper will engage in evaluating the
commission reports and the literature published regarding the reports by both American
and Latin American scholars some of which teach at institutions in the countries that
suffered under a repressive regime. Ultimately it will be clear that truth and reconciliation
committees should ensure that they provide a variety of recommendations that both
acknowledge the guilt of the individuals who have carried out atrocities and also have
strong forms of reparations or compensating those who have been afflicted by a
dictatorships injustice. But most importantly it will be evident that justice is necessary in
order to give stronger significance to the truth that is uncovered, but that justice will very
much depend on the government that is in power and its ability and commitment to bring
about change.
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Chapter 1: Justice
The nature of truth seeking commissions is that they are usually created by the
governments of individual countries to carry out investigations and establish the truth as
best as they can about a specific period of time. In addition, it is important to recognize
that the different countries will have different goals that will probably be influenced by
the regimes that task the commission and the power of the regime. As will be explained
in the particular cases, the three countries being examined had different goals and we can
see that the level of political involvement of perpetrators influenced in the ultimate goals
and the execution of the search for the truth. The search for truth, however, is a
particularly hard one when the perpetrators access most of the knowledge, hold most of
the information regarding the period that commissions are tasked with investigating. This
creates a very strong dilemma that is still debated today, should individuals guilty of
crimes against humanity be given amnesty if they provide information that is given to
ultimately bring the fuller truth the world?
For some guidance on answering this question one can look to the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission in South Africa following the end of Apartheid. During said
commission, amnesty was granted to individuals who told the entire truth and those who
provided a political justification for their involvements in particular crimes. However, to
some the search of truth is not enough to justify the granting of amnesty to criminals. “’It
stinks to high heaven…to imagine that after confessing these people who committed the
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more horrendous crimes will be patted on the shoulder by the TRC.’”2 In addition Kevin
Avruch further adds to this when he cites evidence that there is a strong feeling for
retributive justice in South Africa and that victims feel robbed of legal recourses to
achieve justice3. But Alex Boraine would argue that the approach of a limited amnesty
was actually crucial for a peaceful transition of South Africa into a stable state. As he
points out the right-wing party, the state military and security forces warned Mandela that
if the government attempted to prosecute individuals responsible for the apartheid they
would make peaceful elections impossible4. This power held by the perpetuators of
apartheid is due to the way in which the new government came to be. As Boraine
explains in South Africa the conflict of apartheid was not resolved through a war with a
winning side but instead was resolved through negotiation which meant that there would
have to be some compromises made by both sides5. Furthermore, Elizabeth Kiss would
argue that there was a moral justification in offering amnesty in order to achieve the goals
of the Truth and Reconciliation commission. It was moral to allow criminals to go free in
exchange for peace and stability.
Kiss defends this point of view under the idea of restorative justice, a justice that
focuses on making sure the victims of the egregious acts are at the center of all efforts

2

Rotberg, Robert I. "Truth Commissions and the Provision of Truth, Justice and
Reconciliation." In Truth V. Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions, by Robert I.
Rotberg, Dennis Thompson, & Robert I. I. Rotberg, 3-22. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2000.
3
Avruch, Kevin. 2010. "Truth and Reconciliation Commissions: Problems in
Transitional Justice and the Reconstruction of Identity." Transcultural Psychiatry 33-49.
4
Boraine, Alex. "Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: The Third Way." In Truth V.
Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions, by Robert I. Rotberg, Dennis Thompson, &
Robert I. I. Rotberg, 143. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000
5
Ibid. 147.
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regarding truth and reconciliation committees. Kiss, further than the argument that the
use of amnesty provides for a more peaceful transition, defends the need for the truth as
crucial to moving on as a society. As was the case in many countries that commissioned
truth commissions, the transition to democratic governments came as a result of
negotiations and thus it was vitally important for countries truth commissions to be
viewed as impartial. Additionally, they had the task of ensuring that their reports avoided
presenting a report with “’partisan’ or ‘selective’ accounts of past conflicts” because
doing so would “easily provide the basis for mobilization towards further conflicts’”.6
But more specifically to individuals, Kiss points out that individuals greatly benefit from
the commissions just by being able to tell their story. As she put it, there is a healing
power for survivors being able to tell their story to official commissions, commissions
working for the governments that once used to repress them, the government that once
stripped them of their voice.7 Accepting the role of the truth in being able to transform
societies, how is it that we as societies can balance the countries’, and victims’, right to
the truth and the right to retributive justice. A model that has been suggested by many is
the idea of transitional justice.
Transitional justice according to the International Center for Transitional Justice
is “is the attempt to confront impunity, seek effective redress and prevent recurrence not
in the routine application of normative standards, but in the careful and conscious

6

Kiss, Elizabeth. "Moral Ambition Within and Beyond Political Constraints: Reflections
on Restorative Justice." In Truth V. Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions, by
Robert I. Rotberg, Dennis Thompson, & Robert I. I. Rotberg, 72. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2000.
7
Ibid.

Arroyo

8

appreciation of the contexts where it is to be done”8. Transitional justice is about
comprehensive action that includes criminal prosecution for the most serious offenders,
finding the truth, reparations, and reforms to laws and law enforcement agencies.
Transitional justice relies on a different understanding than retributive justice.
Transitional justice is heavily influence by the idea from restorative justice that the state
should focus more on addressing the victims rather than prosecution of individuals. It is
premised on the idea of forgiveness rather than vengeance which some have argued
actually produces better results for the victims9. It is important to remember at this point
that truth and reconciliation committees operate under the assumption that the truth will
help society reconcile, it will help the society to come together after a tumultuous period
of repression.
One of the harms to reconciliation caused by transitional justice models is the fact
that the trials that do take place create divide between perpetrators and victims10. An
interesting case of this is in Chile where 55% of the population believe that the
dictatorship was bad, 9% said that the dictatorship of Pinochet was good and the rest had
no opinion or had mix thoughts regarding the dictatorship11. Trials following the end of
the dictatorship created divide as those on the right tend view Pinochet favorably because

8

"What is Transitional Justice? | ICTJ." International Center for Transitional Justice. July
11, 2017. Accessed November 17, 2017. https://www.ictj.org/about/transitional-justice.
9
Avruch, Kevin. “Truth and Reconciliation Commissions”
10
Schabas, William A., Hughes, Edel, and Thakur, Ramesh Chandra, eds. 2007.
Atrocities and International Accountability: Beyond Transnational Justice. 36.Tokyo:
United Nations University Press. Accessed November 22, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central.
11
Long, Gideon. "Chile still split over Gen Augusto Pinochet legacy." BBC News.
September 09, 2013. Accessed November 17, 2017. http://www.bbc.com/news/worldlatin-america-24014501.
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they regard him as a hero who defended the country against the dangers of socialism. As
Mani further points out, truth and reconciliation commissions “fail to move from the
divided past of perpetrators versus victims to a united future of all survivors of conflict,
whatever their past role”12. However, this begs the question, should we consider
everyone as a survivor and is this really the best form of justice in order to achieve a
better society in which we prevent this from happening?
Through the cases of the Chile, Argentina, and Guatemala we will consider some
of these models and ideas of justice. We will look at the commission reports issued and
see that lots of the ideas discussed apply to the different cases. The question about which
form of justice is the best form of justice is best defined on a case by case basis. There is
no universal model for truth commissions and every commission is tasked with different
goals and objectives in its investigations. Through an analysis of the three different cases
we will highlight the strengths and the weaknesses of the different reports to try to define
ideal commission goals based on the evidence that is available on the particular cases.

Chapter 2: Chile
Allende and the Rise of Pinochet
In 1970 Salvador Allende became the first democratically elected Socialist
president in all of Latin America. Allende, a long-time politician, had ran for the
presidency on multiple occasions but was finally able to win in 1970. Allende’s socialist
tendencies were quite clear throughout his campaign and when elected into office began

12
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to carry out the socialist reforms on which he had campaigned. One of the largest reforms
of his campaign was the nationalization of Chilean Copper. Copper was a resource that
was, and is, plentiful in Chile and before Allende took the presidency it was mostly
privately owned. According to Felipe Larrain and Patricio Meller, when Salvador
Allende came to power he continued, rather than started, the nationalization of copper
that had been started by the previous administration of Ricardo Frei. Allende and his
predecessor sought to nationalize the foreign owned copper mined through constitutional
reforms that were approved by the congress because at the time the policies were
extremely popular. People liked the idea that they would have a larger stake in the
resources that were plentiful in the country. At first the government engaged in buying
majority of the shares in the larger copper foreign owned companies. Ultimately, the
form of compensation to the foreign based owners of the mines would be a huge point of
contention with the state. Under the constitutional amendment, the state would pay the
companies their market value but was allowed to subtract from the market value the
“excess profits obtained by the foreigners since 1965… some $800 million from the total
indemnification”13. But Allende would not stop at controlling copper mining but would
expand to nationalize even more of the countries resources, including those not owned by
foreign actors.
The fact that Allende wanted to take control over non-cooper assets owned by
domestic owners presented a problem because the constitutional amendment didn’t help

13
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much in domestic matters. However, Allende and Unidad Politica, his political party,
swiftly moved throughout the country nationalizing both large and small companies and
even nationalizing 90% of the banking sector by the end of the first year14. Through the
use of laws that had been passed in previous administrations but had not been used yet.
Allende’s government targeted companies and industries at its own discretion never
really defining which targets it would go after. The rapid nationalization that went on
throughout the country created resentment within right wing political parties and the
wealthier members of society because the notion of private property seemed to be quickly
evaporating. The right wing political groups and the Partido Democrata Cristiano, which
formed part of the UP that helped Allende get elected but left the political coalition in
opposition of aggressive nationalization efforts, sought the assistance of the United States
Central Intelligence Agency in carrying out a coup de tat.
In 1970 there was an organized effort to try to prevent the election of Salvador
Allende in which sympathizers of a former military officer Roberto Viaux, sought to
kidnap Rene Schneider, the current army commander in chief. Though declassified CIA
documents show that the agency did not actively support the organization, despite
communication, they did provide a Viaux plotter who escaped prosecution with $35,000
USD in “an effort to keep the prior contact secret”15. With regards to the 1973 coup the
United States CIA maintains that it did not provide direct support for the coup but does
acknowledge that it did provide funding to sway the elections in the country and to hurt

14
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the public image of Allende and the socialist experiment. Following the coup, the United
States continued to provide funding for propaganda efforts by the conservative news
organization, El Mercurio, which is believed to have received at least $2 million16. In the
months leading up to the coup the right wing political groups spent money on antiAllende propaganda, some of which came from the money allocated by the United States
funds appropriated for delegitimizing the Allende regime before the 1976 election.
Numerous strikes throughout the country along with shortages of goods lead the Allende
government to push for rationing of state resources. The economic crisis was caused for a
variety of reasons including United States economic pressure on Chile. “recently
declassified NSC records on Chile show conclusively that the Nixon administration
moved quickly, quietly and politically to shut down multilateral and bilateral aid to
Chile”17. Additionally, the United states worked hard to ensure that the World Bank
disqualified Chile “for a pending $21 million livestock-improvement credit.”18 Coupled
with a downgrading of its credit score at the behest of president Nixon the United States
was successful in its mission to economically undermine the Allende administration.
Which would prove vital to the legitimacy of the coup. The economic pressure and chaos
in Chile prior to the coup of September 11, 1973 proved to be vital to the tolerance and

16

Bonnefoy, Pascale. "Documenting U.S. Role in Democracy’s Fall and Dictator’s Rise
in Chile." The New York Times. October 14, 2017. Accessed November 27, 2017.
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legitimacy of the civil military dictatorship that would seize power in brutal
bombardment of the national palace.

Chile under Pinochet
Following the seizure of power by the Pinochet thousands of political dissidents
went missing. The Chilean government would detain and forceful disappear thousands of
individuals it perceived a threat to the regime and as opponents. The state would use the
national police for, Los Carabineros and the DINA, the states’ secret police organization,
to carry out its detentions. Individuals detained would be imprisoned in makeshift
concentration camps throughout the country and would be tortured and/or murdered. The
government in many cases would deny having individuals in captivity either arguing that
they had never detained an individual or that the individual had been set free.
Additionally, when an influential leader or member of the community was forcefully
disappeared El Mercurio would publish news articles in which the detained was charged
with conspiracy against the government in an attempt to legitimize the detainment to the
general public. Some members of society not directly affected were suspicious but life
seemed to be better under the military dictatorship.
It is important to point out that following the seizure of power by the Pinochet
regime the shortages had seemed to disappear. This is because the right wing political
groups had funded shortages and strikes throughout the country in order to create the
economic chaos to prime for the success of the coup. Following the coup, the strikes and
shortages seemed to go away and the government engaged in denationalization in an
effort to undue all of Allendes policies which was very popular by business owners. The
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seeming improvement in the economy seemed to legitimize the military council that had
taken control of the country and had instituted wide sweeping reforms to the country’s
policies that had as a focus the privatization of the economy, culminating in an overhaul
of the constitution after it ratified in a plebiscite in September 1980. For 17 years the
military dictatorship would rule in Chile until the 1990 when it agreed to hold a
referendum asking the country whether it wanted the equivalent of another presidential
term under the military dictatorship or if it wanted to hold elections. The country
narrowly voted to call for the end of the dictatorship and for elections to be held.
However, the elections were held under the condition that the new government would
agree to uphold some of the demands of the government, demands that will later be
discussed in this chapter. Under the military council set up by Pinochet Chilean dissidents
and opponents would live some of the darkest years of their lives.

Transition
In 1990, following a plebiscite in which the people declared that they wanted free
and fair elections, the first truth commission would be established by Patricio Aylwin.
Throughout his campaign Aylwin expressed his support for the establishment of a truth
commission that would bring to light all the truths that had been covered up during the 17
years under a military dictatorship. Additionally, as Priscilla Hayer tells us, though the
commissions can serve as a means of establishing the truth, truth and reconciliation
commissions also serve the purpose of the state acknowledging its past19. Acknowledging

19
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the past actions of the state is even more relevant especially in the case of Chile where for
17 years the state covered up and denied its involvement in the forced disappearance of
thousands of individuals. It is with this in mind that in May of 1990, Aylwin established
la Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación (the National Commission for Truth
and Reconciliation) that would more commonly be referred to as the Rettig report, after
Raul Rettig the chair of the commission. The established purpose of the National
Commission for Truth and Reconciliation was “to investigate abuses resulting in death or
disappearance over the previous seventeen years of military rule.”20 However, the
mandate specified that the commission could only investigate human rights abuses that
resulted in death or disappearance thereby excluding the investigation of cases of torture
that did not result in death. The rationale that Aylwin gave for not including torture as
part of the report was the fact that the only denied the allegations of murder and forced
disappearance but not cases of exile or illegal imprisonment.21
Within this larger mandate the commission tasks were outlined in the commission
report. The commission was to establish the events that transpired, to try to identify
victims by name and what happened to them, to “recommend such measures of reparation
and reinstatement as it regards just” and “to recommend the legal and administrative
measures which in its judgement should be adopted in order to prevent actions such as
those mentioned in this article from being committed”22. However, the commission report
also points out that the commission did not have prosecutorial power, meaning that the

20
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commission did not have the right or the power to subpoena individuals or compel
testimony from those it suspected would have a lot to add to the report. The nature of this
organization was a governmental organization that would try to collect as much
information as possible. Thus, government organizations were expected to fully comply
and collaborate with the committee and hand over information that they had that they
could provide. But the success of this commission was sometimes limited due to the fact
that the military commanders that formed part of the military council with Augusto
Pinochet remained in their post after the induction of the new president. Because of
legislation that Pinochet passed these individuals were given an extended period of time
as commanders of their posts and even received immunity as part of a condition for free
and fair elections. It is important to point out that because of policies implemented during
the civil military dictatorship Pinochet had a seat in the senate for life. Such involvement
by the perpetuators within the government made some of the investigations difficult to
complete.
The commission at the end of its investigation evaluated a total of 2,920 cases of
victims of human rights violation and political violence though it was not able to come to
a conviction on 641 of those cases23. The Rettig report furthermore found that there were
957 cases in which victims disappeared after arrest, while about 1,068 victims were killed
by government agents or persons at their service24. The very same table points out that an
estimated 4.3% of the victims were victims of politically motivated private citizens. The
following table from the report highlights the reasons for some of the disappearances.

23
24
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Figure 1. 25
The Pinochet regime targeted political dissidents the most. As we can observe
about half of the victims had some sort of political affiliation. And we notice that those
who suffered the most were the left wing political parties. Let us remember that the
Christian Democrat party actually helped in orchestrating the coup against Salvador
Allende but the total number of victims that were identified to have ties with the
Christian Democrat party were about 7%. Meanwhile the total number of victims that
identified with say the socialist party was at about 405 at the time of the report. This is in
line with what was discussed before that the purpose of the dictatorship was to undue the
socialist movement that had started to spread throughout Chile. The government would
either detain individuals it sought or would offer edicts demanding that specific
individuals report voluntarily for questioning to the police. The report gives the names of
different individuals who were not considered politically active. In particular they point

25
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out the cases Juan Mamani Garcia and Nicolas Chanez Chanez as individuals who were
detained and disappeared. But furthermore, the report points out that these, among others,
were accused of being involved in drug trafficking and contraband though they did not
receive a trial. Rather individuals were arrested and taken to camps. Subsequently the
perpetuators who detained these individuals would send letters to families that their loved
ones claiming that they had been set free. This is where the confusion was created during
the dictatorship. Individuals were detained and tortured and murdered, but as far as the
public knew those detained were guilty of something and those detained were often “set
free”. It is from here that we begin to delve into the first question regarding the blame
that the commission placed as part of its final report. Because if the leaders of the
dictatorship remained in power and involved within the state affairs how accurate of a
portrayal was the report in framing the guilt of those very same actors.

Blame
From the perspective of many the Rettig report had many shortcomings one of
which was the inability of the report to accurately frame what happened during the years
of dictatorship. The report was a very surface level description of the years of
dictatorship that was able to identify some of the bodies and the identify those who may
have disappeared. Additionally, it is believed that the report may not have published all
of the information that the commission came across given the actors that were involved
within the actual commission. President Aylwin attempted to establish the legitimacy of
the commission by making sure that it was comprised of different types of individuals. In
particular Aylwin included Gonzalo Vial Correa as one of the commissioners that formed
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part of the Rettig Commission. Gonzalo Vial was the minister of education during the
dictatorship and thus it led some to question the ties or the loyalties that he still felt to the
armed forces.26 Barbara De Cock and Daniel Michaud Maturana seek to try to establish
that the report itself is not as truthful as it can be based off an analysis of the language in
the text. More specifically they believe that the report tries to hide some facts or does not
present them in an adequate way by choosing certain phrases over others. The others
explain to us the term “agentividad”.
To try to translate it may not be a fair representation so I will try to best define the
explanation given by the authors of the meaning and the significance of the terms. The
definition in Spanish provided by the authors is, “La agentividad se definió como la
relación causal entre una entidad agente, una acción intencionada y el estado de quien
sufre los efectos de la acción.”27 Summarized the authors are trying to communicate that
“agentividad” is the causal relationship between and agent, an intended action and the
state of a those who are affected by the intended action. “Agentividad” can be expressed
through four different means,
1. Expressions that make direct or indirect reference to the perpetuators.
2. The verbal predicates that imply the intentionality of the perpetuators (e.g. detain,
execute)
3. The structural syntax that invokes the perpetuators
4. The participle that expresses the state of the victim as a result of the action committed
by the perpetuator (e.g. disappeared, shot) 28
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Figure 229
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Figure 3- A translated version of figure 230
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Furthermore, the authors clarify that there is varying degree of reference to the
perpetuators of violence. The first level is when the sentence directly implies a single or
multiple perpetuators giving the example of a patrol of military members. Meanwhile the
second degree would be when the sentence states an organization and the reader is
expected to imply the actors that carried out the action. And finally, the third degree is
when certain words are used to imply another action so for example they give the
example of the use of detain and how individuals read it as execution.31 It is with this
methodology that the authors engage in the analysis of the Rettig report and provide us
with the results reported in figure 2.
The authors of the report provide us a with a breakdown of the different levels of
“agentividad” and the frequency with which they occur throughout the report. It is
important to highlight how the report tends to favor the objective truth and communicates
this at the expense of placing blame directly on individuals. We are able to observe that
the first level of “agentividad is used about 59 times throughout the report, roughly 4.3%
of the report. This first level according to the table is comprised of naming the
perpetuator as an agent and expresses the intention of the agent and the casualty that
resulted of said intention. The second level of agentividad has to do with the perpetuator
being presented as a complementary agent. An example of a level 1 “agentividad” is the
example “On October 9 Carabineros of the Penco Station and civilians arrested him at his
worksite”32. In this example, Carabineros are the national police that patrol Chile and in
this example the report specifies the station form which the Carabineros were, as well as
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explicitly mentioning that we are dealing with the Carabineros versus say the army.
Meanwhile a level 2 agentividad would be more on the lines of a statement like “on
November 19, 1973 they were executed by military personal, on the road between
Calama y Antofagasta, the following 26 individuals.”33 In this example the perpetuators
are summarized to be military personal without specifying what branch of the military
was responsible for the comes up about 472 times in the report, or about 34.2% of the
time. It becomes obvious that the commission comprised of individuals from across the
political spectrum wrote the paper of level of objectivity that to some obscured [art of the
truth, the truth there were those who were guilty for human rights abuses and those who
were victims, a distinction that some felt should be muddled. Yet De Cock’s conclusion
is that the report has a tendency to avoid centering the attention on the perpetuator though
she believes that the reason for this is the existence of a silent pact between the armed
forces and the political parties in the immediate aftermath of the dictatorship.34
Furthermore, beyond the structural composition of the sentences throughout the
report we can observe that the report itself has very limited aims and excludes many
topics that would be of great concern to a society after a dictatorship. As Daniela Soto
points out, it is no accident that in Chile only a truth commission was decreed following
the end of the dictatorship and that tribunals to hold those individuals responsible
accountable were not implemented. The purpose of the truth and reconciliation
commission was to establish and clarify only the truth that was necessary to bring
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reconciliation to society35. Many including Daniela Soto view the Rettig commission as a
weak and toothless commission that did not accomplish everything that it should have, in
their view the commission needed to have some judicial power to be more effective. In
addressing the question of who is guilty, Soto points out that the problem is that the
commission presents one narrative, the narrative of the victims while omitting the
narratives of those who carried out the acts and those who are guilty. To Soto
reconciliation is a paradox because,
Reconciliation is about the reintegration of the criminal into the community by means of
a common recognition that violence has affected everyone and to create a new
community free of violence, everyone must show themselves willing to incorporate
themselves into it publicly acknowledging the criminal nature of their previous actions.
Hilb, 2012:14536

With this definition in mind, Soto questions how it is that the society can incorporate the
individual who has confessed to crimes against humanity and create reconciliation. Soto
summarizes the case of the Rettig report in the following way, the Rettig report by
focusing on establishing a single narrative from the perspective of the victim, established
a shared responsibility amongst all of society by neglecting to name specific guilty
individuals. The Rettig Report provided a sense of the gravity of the human rights abuses
and helped promote the idea that all members should be vigilant in order to prevent the
atrocities from happening in the future.37
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But is blame necessary for the success of a report? Some would argue that the
Truth Commission was successful despite the existence of a silent agreement that did not
place blame arguing that maybe this silent pact was necessary for the peaceful transition
in a time when the armed forces remained in the hands of those who ruled in the
dictatorship. Regardless of whether there is blame placed or not in the truth commission
there is another important question that remains, how we rebuild as a society? More
specifically how do we help those most affected by the dictatorship, the victims and the
families of the victims?

Victims as a Starting Point
The Rettig Commission made recommendations regarding how the government
should deal with the victims of the violence and their families. Firstly, the Rettig
Commission recognized that it was not able to investigate all of the cases of human rights
abuses because of the timeframe that it was given. Following the publishing of the report
president Aylwin publicly acknowledged the role of the state in the human rights
atrocities by the state by acknowledging and certifying the report. Meanwhile he also
made a public apology to the victims on behalf of the state. The report while generally
accepted to be accurate did receive criticism and was rejected by the military
organizations that were headed by the generals of the dictatorship in addition to the
Supreme Court that was the same that was in power during the latter years of the
dictatorship. President Aylwin to show his commitment to acknowledging the report
established the Corporación Nacional de Reparación y Reconciliación, also known as the
National Corporation for Reparation and Reconciliation. “The objective of the
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corporation was the ‘coordination, execution, and promotion of the actions necessary for
complying with the recommendations contained in the Report of the Truth and
Reconciliation National Commission.’”38 One of the recommendations that report
highlighted was the necessity for the state to materially compensate the victims through
reparations in order to address the moral harm to victims.
The reparations went further than establishing a monthly pension plan by
establishing subsidies for the “education of victims’ children, medical benefits.”39 Chile
is a particular case because it had at the time, and continues to have, one of the strongest
South American economies in the region because of its copper mines. Eric WiebelhausBraum points out that 80% of eligible families had accepted the reparations package
within 9 months of the creation of the program.40 The pension for the nearly 5000
families that receive this compensation is estimated to be at about $5000 annually, while
those same families continue to receive other social benefits such as access to
scholarships and psychological services.41 But beyond the reparations programs the
corporation created also helped in increasing the number of cases that were examined.
Following the establishment of the corporation which invited for new cases to
submitted for investigation the number of cases soared from 600 unresolved cases from
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the Rettig commission to nearly 2,119 open cases in less than two years.42 Legally
victims benefitted from the investigative work of this organization because the
whereabouts of missing persons became clearer and family members could now prove to
insurance companies that a family member was deceased in addition to spouses being
allowed to get divorces.43 The reparation recommendations made by the Rettig
Commission were largely successful in attempting to provide some compensation for the
past. However, something that the report established was the need to ensure that this
never happened again.

Preventing future Human Rights Abuses
The fundamental goal of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission chaired by
Rettig was to collect information and investigate claims of human rights abuses so that
people could know what happened. The purpose was to make clear the timeline and the
actions that transpired in state secrecy for 17 years. But once the truth is known it is also
vitally important that the society not forget so as to not allow for the events to occur
again.
Following the publishing of the Rettig report there were attempts to circulate the
report to as many people as possible. However, a few weeks after release of the report
there were attacks against right wing political groups in addition to the assassination of a
right wing political leader. This lead the government to stop the circulation of the report
out of fear that there would be more violence in addition to the fact that the media
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wouldn’t focus on the actual findings of the report but rather the violence that ensued.
The public discussion as a result regarding the need for justice, forgiveness and
repentance never really took place because of the diversion of the public attention to the
violence.44 In line with the efforts of remembering the past the Corporation helped found
the Memorial for the Disappeared and the Executed for Political Reasons.45 This
memorial in Santiago’s main cemetery pays tribute to all the victims by engraving the
names of the individuals on a wall. Today in Chile you can find memorials to the victims
of the dictatorship throughout the country. In particular in Santiago, Chile former
concentration camps have been remodeled and serve as a museum space for individuals
to walk through. A particular example of a concentration camp is el Estadio Nacional, the
national football stadium in Santiago. The stadium was used to detain, torture, and
murder prisoners and today is still used by the national football team for important
international matches and for local club matches. But on the grounds of the stadium
citizens can walk through a museum that tells the history of how the museum was used
during the dictatorship. Furthermore, the Rettig commission recommended the
reformation of laws in order to further bolster human rights in Chile.
One of the first recommendations by the commission was to urge the Chilean
government to adopt more laws that furthered the protection of human rights. In addition,
the commission urged the state to make sure that the laws were in line with protecting
human rights and if a law did not comply with the ideas of human rights then the state
should work to ensure that those laws were removed. It specifically points to the military
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code of justice that allowed the military to execute suspects “without a previous legal
process” by the means of War Tribunals46. Additionally, in order to “enhance the
integrity and accountability of judges, the Rettig Commission called for the publication
of clear standards of judicial qualification” and recommended that through a
constitutional amendment judges should able to be dismissed very similarly to the way
which legislators and the president can be.47
The report it would appear made an honest attempt at addressing some of the
issues within the parameters that it was operating under. As mentioned before Pinochet
and other members of the dictatorship were given amnesty and were free from
prosecution because they threatened to destabilize the country if they didn’t. However,
that would all change a couple years down the line when the United Kingdom arrested
Pinochet for crimes against humanity. Meanwhile the Chilean courts, under the Guzman
Doctrine defined “disappearance cases in which the body was never found, as kidnapping
cases"48, kidnapping was not protected under amnesty. By mid 2008 the Supreme Court
of Chile had 20 judges appointed to focus on disappearances and there were about 500
military personnel and civilian collaborator on trial with 250 convictions. The report
made recommendations but what we are able to observe is that the mere existence of the
report was necessary for justice to be brought about even if not explicitly mentioned in
the report. The report a representation of truth, endorsed by the government and a report
whose recommendations were also followed paved the path for people to know what
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really happen during the dictatorship and for people to bring about the justice they sought
when the time came.
Chile’s case is a very particular case and we have observed some of the
weaknesses and some of the strengths within a report that is considered to be a success.
But it is with this analysis that we move on to the case study of Guatemala, a country
with a complicated history and truth commission.

Chapter 3: Guatemala
In March of 1999, President Bill Clinton apologized to Guatemala on behalf of
the United States for its involvement in the Guatemalan civil war, involvement that was
in the form of supporting right wing governments. In 1954 the United States, through the
Central Intelligence Agency, provided support for the overthrow of a democratically
elected president who was suspected of being a communist threat and instead place
Colonel Carlos Castillo. Four years later would mark the start of a 36 year bloody civil
war as leftist guerilla groups sought to take the government back. Though during the civil
war there was a period of time in which civilians took back control of the government
through a presidential election, the civil “war only intensified with a major
counterinsurgency campaign by the army.”49 The United States in the civil war trained
officers teaching them about counterinsurgency techniques through the US Army School
of the Americas. The report that was released actually places blame on the United States
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backing of right wing paramilitary groups as a reason for which so many died during the
civil war, particularly the scorched earth tactics that the United States taught. For
decades, the country was run by military backed leaders and in 1982 General Efrain Rios
Montt orchestrated a coup to take the power. A graduate of the school of the Americas,
and esteemed by President Ronald Reagan as a man of “great personal integrity and
commitment”50, Montt dissolved the civilian government by annulling a 1965
constitution, dissolving congress and suspending political parties51. Montt with the use of
the military and of civilian squads would take back lots of land from the guerrilla in the
country regions. Montt would come to employ essentially a scorched earth campaign in
an effort to eradicate the Revolutionary National Unity of Guatemala(URNG), a rebel
group that had been fighting government forces. But the savage massacre of innocent
individuals would not end there but would last another decade.
It wasn’t until 1993 when the United Nations renewed peace talk negotiations
between the rebels of the Guatemalan Revolutionary National Unity and the Guatemalan
governments, that Guatemala started to see the light at the end of the dark tunnel. The
United States Institute of Peace points out that in 1987 there were peace talks between
government forces and URNG but they ultimately broke down because the URNG was
engaged in subversive activities throughout.52 Though the United Nations facilitated
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peace talks both the government and URNG agreed to set up an independent panel to
investigate human rights abuses during the years of civil war, the Commission for
Historical Clarification.
The Commission was chaired by Christian Tomuschat, a law faculty member at
Berlin’s Humboldt University. The other two members were a woman of Mayan descent
and a Guatemalan man, all of the commissioners were highly esteemed. The commission
was set up in a way that it would seem as impartial in the investigation in order to add
credibility in a country that had just begun the process of rebuilding after 36 years of civil
war. The conception of the truth commission in Guatemala was a different than that of
Chile because it was not commissioned by a government but rather was a compromise of
peace talk negotiations between both belligerents of the civil war, making us consider the
relative power of bargaining that the parties held in the negotiations. The commission
was prohibited from publishing the names of any perpetuators, or as many other truth
commission wasn’t able to punish offenders. As Amy Ross points out there were many in
society that were dissatisfied with the commission and its report in that it was seen as
weak. But additionally, many thought that the 2 years allotted to investigate 36 years of
civil war was dangerously inadequate. Some of the inefficiencies that will be noted
throughout this chapter can be attributed to the fact that there was lots of disagreement
and debate over the purpose of the truth commission but more specifically what the truth
was. Both sides wanted to be able to control the narrative of the truth which proved to be
so contentious that “the word truth was conspicuously absent”53 from the title of the
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commission. What distinguished the commission in Guatemala from that of Chile is that
this commission had some reports of missing individuals but its main concern was
investigating the genocide of the indigenous people in the country side at the hands of
government regime. As result the commission had to try harder in order to reach out to
individuals in the country side and to try to gather testimony of injustice from those
related to victims. Additionally, in many rural communities, individuals who participated
in the crimes against humanity continued to hold power and that discouraged some from
speaking about their experiences fearing that they would face repercussion and that the
largely symbolic commission would not be able to protect them54. But in the end when
the report was published lots of the skepticism regarding the strength of the report
seemed to diminish.

Blame
In terms of blame, there are many ways to observe the means by which blame was
placed on the perpetuators of the merciless killings. Though characterized by coups and
dictatorships the conflict in Guatemala can best be described as a civil war in which
armed rebellions sought to take back the power they thought had been illegitimately been
taken in the first place. So, when the report was being commissioned and important
question was on everyone’s mind, who would be blamed the most? Both sides argued
that they had undeniable proof of the other side carrying out acts against human rights.
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So, the commission had to be delicate and precise when describing the atrocities carries
out by militants of either side.
Ultimately, the commission’s investigation found that more than 200,000
individuals were killed in the civil war. Though the commission was prohibited from
naming specific individuals, on page 33 of the report it did establish that the government
military and government paramilitary forces were responsible for 93% of the human
rights violations investigated during the civil war.55 Most of the casualties, most of the
persecution was aimed at rural indigenous populations who were perceived to be allies of
the insurgent groups. Of the more than 200,000 killed it is estimated that 83% of the
victims were Mayan and 17% were Ladino.56 In light of the undeniable evidence that
indigenous populations were systematically targeted the report labeled the actions by the
state as genocide. At the time of the report this was seen as a major victory for the
victims who thought that the commission would be soft on the perpetuators. The report
pointed to the fact that villages were razed throughout the country and that the
government engaged in the indiscriminate killing of innocent civilians. The report in
regard to those within the state responsible for the violence blames the army and the
successive governments that failed to investigate and punish the injustices of previous
regimes. The report does highlight the Chiefs of Staff for National Defense as the highest
authority most culpable for the violation of human rights57. However, with the objective
of being an impartial investigative body it explicitly states on the next page that the
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insurgents throughout the civil war were responsible for approximately 3% of the human
rights violations documented in the study. Though minimal in comparison to the
violations by the state it was important for the commission to recognize the blame that lie
on both sides of the civil war. It points out immoral acts for which they were responsible
such as arbitrary executions, forced recruitment of minors, and indiscriminate massacres.
To give a sense of the gravity of the violence one must look at the fact that there was
evidence that the insurgent groups were responsible 32 massacres and yet their share of
violations was a mere 3%58. The report furthermore states that the individuals at the top
of the guerilla forces shared undeniable responsibility in the violation of international
humanitarian laws because many of the violations happened because of their consent or
their knowledge of. The leaders of the guerillas knew that they too would be blamed for
human rights violations within the report.
Many believe that the commission was weak because the rebels didn’t hold
enough power and so they couldn’t compel the publishing of names within the Historical
Clarification Commission. However, as Ross points out there was some doubt by the
URNG as to whether or not they wanted names to be published. Ross gives us the
example of how the guerrilla leaders knew that the military and government would be
able to control the flow of information that was published and that though the guerilla
leaders weren’t responsible for as many human rights violations, the report may be
misconstrued by the media to damage guerilla commanders59. Had names been published
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the leaders of the guerilla forces too would have been targeted. Regardless, the report did
go on to publish that there weren’t two actors involved, the atrocities of the civil war
were enabled by different actors including universities and churches.60 Additionally, as
the NACLA report implies the state knew of the limited capabilities of insurgents to pose
a threat to the state but the state magnified the threat in order to justify its annihilation of
the opposition political forces.
Indigenous populations were murdered in what is considered to be a genocide and
thus it is important to evaluate the means through which the commission sought to
compensate victims of the civil war.

Reparations
The Historical Clarification Commission recommended that the National
Reparations Program be established in order to restore material possessions stolen from
victims such as land, provide economic compensation, psychological rehabilitative
services among other practices to restore human dignity. The report specified some of the
logistics of the organization and how it would be financed but largely only gave vague
recommendations allowing the state to define some of the questions. The problem in
Guatemala, however, was that at the end of the war they did not have a strong economy
that could actually afford all the reparations programs recommended by the commission.
Additionally, as part of the peace agreements the state agreed to carry out economic
reforms, economic reforms that in 2006 had yet to be carried out in a satisfactory
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manner61. One of the major obstacles to economic restructuring was the wealthy
members of Guatemala who blocked reforms that would hurt them such as increased
taxes. June Erlick points out that in 1997 there was proposed legislation in the congress to
establish a property taxes that never was approved. In 1997 there were no property taxes
in a country where 83% of the population lived in poverty and 59% in extreme poverty.62
The National Reparations Program was established nearly a decade after the publication
of Historical Clarification report in 2005.
Under the established program approved families receive compensation of $3000
which is criticized for being too little. In addition, the number of cases that still need to
be reviewed is a very large one and the staff that is available is very small and so the
National Reparations Program is backlogged. However, in the last few years the
government has reduced the amount of compensation. The Washington Post in 2009 gave
the example of a man who lost 16 relatives and after 5 years his family received $5,400 in
compensation along with an apology.63 In 2009 the state acknowledged that it had 64,000
requests pending, the state also acknowledges that there isn’t enough money for all the
victims so it has had to privilege older, more vulnerable victims.64 What we see is a state
that is unable to carry out all of the recommendations because of the limited economic
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resources of the state and the sheer number of cases in which individuals were murdered.
Despite the state being unable to fairly compensate the families of victims we see that the
state has taken some limited steps in order to try to prevent future abuses in line with the
recommendations of the report.

Remembering
Guatemala, like Chile, hopes to prevent future human rights abuses by making
sure that individuals remember the past. Immediately following the publishing of the
report, the president at the time apologized for the violence committed by the state. The
state in 2004 dedicated February 25 as the “Day of Dignity”, the national remembrance
day. One of the recommendations of the commission was that the government should
engage in erecting monuments meant to the preservation of the memory of the genocide.
Though there have been some established the state there are many communities that have
come together to erect these monuments honoring their dead. As Gidley and Roberts
point out the dead are highly respected by the living within the Mayan Culture. To the
Mayan the dead continue to be alive in their own way and are able to communicate with
the living65. The importance of monuments to the Mayans is explicitly shown through the
example of Rio Negro. In Rio Negro, a monument was built at the site of a mass grave in
which 143 bodies had been buried. The monument was vandalized a few days after it was
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erected and the community came together and rebuilt it this time naming the killers as
being members of the civil patrols.66
The report additionally recommended that the state ensure that it commits to
enforcing and fully carrying out the Peace Accords as well as the National Reconciliation
Law. However, the National Reconciliation law is widely criticized for not allowing the
prosecution of criminals of the civil war67. The National Reconciliation Law gave
amnesty to those actors responsible for human right violations and in exchange the
government would reincorporate members of the Guatemalan National Revolutionary
Union and would give amnesty to political crimes by insurgents.
Ultimately, what we observe is that Guatemala has not been very successful in
implementing the reforms suggested by the United Nations led Historical Clarification
commission. The government has met resistance from wealthy citizens and political
parties when it has sought to bring about some of the reforms. Additionally, the state
lacks the resources to distribute the most equitable form of reparations especially given
the fact that there are hundreds of thousands of victims of the civil war. Though the UN
led Historical Clarification Commission made waves when it described the targeted
killing of Mayan and Ladino populations as a genocide the government has not been as
impactful in addressing the victims.
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Chapter 4: Argentina and ¡Nunca Más!
Similar to Guatemala, Argentina suffered a period of instability and violence
through a “civil war” that primarily erupted following the military coup of 1976 that
overthrew President Isabel Peron. President Isabel Peron came to power following the
death of her husband President Juan Peron. President Juan Peron in 1973 was serving his
third term as President of Argentina after winning the election of 1973 through the use of
a stand in candidate. The reason he had to use a stand in was that during his second term
as president he was overthrown in a coup orchestrated by the military in 1955. Following
the coup, he was forced into exile by the government until 1973 the year democratic
elections took place. Hector Campora ran in the 1973 election with the intentions of
winning in order to pave the way for Peron to return to the country and be able to win
elections. As such shortly after victory of Campora, both he and his vice president
resigned from power forcing the country to have elections again and this time Peron
himself was in the election. It is important to highlight however, that the elections of
1973 occurred right after the end of a military regime that had repressed political
dissidents. Left wing extremist that arose during the dictatorship did not cease to exist
and continued to carry out murders and atrocities. However, it is also important to point
out that government atrocities did not end with the election of Peron.
During the presidency of Juan Peron and that of Isabel Peron the state continued
to use violence against the countries’ leftist organizations. The struggle for power in the
country between military, paramilitary, governmental and rebel forces continued
throughout the presidencies of the Perons’. This chaos and political repression of the left
would mark the beginning of the Dirty War, the war that the Truth commission in
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Argentina would ultimately focus on. Though there was an escalation of violence
following the coup we observe that the seeds of repression were planted during the Peron
presidencies. The military following the coup would rule the country through a series of
military councils that were at the head of a dictatorial regime. For the next 7 years a
series of general would be the leaders of the country meanwhile continuing their violent
repression of the left and of political enemies of the state. As Crenzel points out, torture
and violence against political opponents was systematically practiced throughout the era
of military dictatorship as the military was resolved on ending once and for all the leftist
organizations in the country68.
The states’ repression of the media and of political dissidents created fear within
Argentina and would be further manifested through feelings of indifference held by
individuals throughout the country. As Bustos, Webb, and Fairbairn tell us, many
individuals began to believe that those who disappeared must have done so for a reason
but even more the feeling was that one should not get involved out fear of being hurt
themselves.69 These feelings arose because the government would forcefully disappear
individuals and later deny having the individual, sometimes even denying that they knew
of said individual, very much like Chile. When victims asked and sought answers to the
whereabouts of their missing relatives all they got was silence. Additionally, Bustos
points out that the individuals could not rely on the media to help them out because the
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media itself was also under the threat of persecution by the government. The government
targeted individuals that had the power and would spread information regarding its
regime including, musicians, writers, lawyers, psychologists among others70.
The military regimes after stepping down and handing power to the
democratically president would find themselves being prosecuted by the government of
Raúl Alfonsin. Upon taking the office of the presidency Alfonsin was swift in
establishing la Comisión Nacional Sobre la Desparición de Personas(CONADEP) also
known as the National Commission on the Disappeared. The Argentine truth commission
CONADEP, has long been regarded as one of the most successful commissions given
that the findings of the commissions would be used for the eventual prosecution of those
guilty of crimes against humanity.71The government of Alfonsin was committed to
ensuring that those individuals responsible for the crimes carried out during the Dirty was
were held accountable.

Blame
The last military leader of the government established a law that would give
immunity to those largely responsible for crimes during the dictatorship. However,
Alfonsin upon taking office sought to immediately get rid of this immunity that the
military had given itself. Furthermore, the President held that both the military and the
armed leftist organizations should be held equally responsible for the chaos and
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bloodshed of the 7 years.72 This action by the President would prove not only
empowering to the victims, and the family members of the victims but would also prove
very beneficial to CONADEP and its mission of establishing truth and eventually justice.
CONADEP originally was tasked with collecting reports of individuals who
disappeared and then to look into the cases. However, the commission during its
investigation realized that in order to find out the most truth about those who had
disappeared it had to go directly to the source of the disappearance, the perpetuators.73
The commission hoped that by identifying the perpetuators it would be able to get the
best account of what happened and would be able to help and even larger number of
victims and it would be able to identify more individuals that had been forcefully
disappeared. Additionally, during the Dirty War state forces would torture and illegally
detain thousands of individuals in clandestine detention centers. There were about 50
centers found by CONADEP throughout the country of Argentina. Clandestine detention
centers were for the most part unmarked centers and sometimes would be a home or
building in the middle of a neighborhood in the greater Buenos Aires province for
example. The testimony of the perpetuators would be much more helpful in identifying
the clandestine centers and identifying who was held in these secretive centers. However,
the names of these perpetuators were not in the official report published by CONADEP.
Within the actual report CONADEP made more generalizations in regard to those that
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were responsible. The report does go further in summarizing some of the testimonies that
were collected during the investigation.
CONADEP points out how many of the testimonies by perpetuators of human
rights abuses were not telling their stories out of a sense of guilt but rather for personal
gain. The report highlights that many individuals decided to give testimony because they
thought they had been abandoned by those military leaders they had served. Meanwhile
others were afraid that they would be murdered by individuals higher up than them
because they knew too much. But through the report’s section on the agents of repression
it becomes obvious that the agents who gave testimony did not feel guilty over their
actions because they genuinely believed in the cause that they fought for. Additionally,
the defense lawyers of the military junta advanced the same notion as a defense. The
actions by their defendants were as a result of the “’war against subversion’”.74This is
further expressed when individuals give testimony that they felt used by the state when
they reflect and realize that the state was not actually promoting the nationalist ideals “for
which they had joined the Army, the Policy or paramilitary groups in the first place.”75
But the report also acknowledges other institutions for the impunity and the inaction that
they exercised during the military dictatorships. The report specifically has a section in
which it talks about the testimonies in which the catholic church is singled out or
mentioned as being accomplices or passive actors in the face of injustice and repression.
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Blame seems to be placed in a very general manner avoiding the publishing of names of
those perpetuators identified during the investigation. However, the commission at the
end of the report would recommend that the government ensure that the documents and
the files collected during the investigations be handed over to the courts in order to aid in
the prosecution of criminals. The Argentina truth commission focused on establishing the
truth, thereby accomplishing the task it had been given. However, knowing that it would
be possible to bring about prosecutions sought to identify individuals who were guilty
and collect the files that they could later have delivered to courts to carry out
proceedings.

Reparations
The commission suggested the state pass laws to provide victims and the family
of victims, with “economic assistance, study grants, social security and employment and,
at the same time, to authorize measures considered necessary to alleviate the many and
varied family and social problems caused by the disappearances”. Additionally, the state
established the National Commission for Right to Identity as an institution that would be
responsible for searching for children that went missing during the Dirty War. This was
to address the fact that children, babies were separated from their parents in some cases
and given to members of the government to take care of. To this day hundreds of mothers
and grandmothers continue to look for their children who were taken from them. The
government recognizes the difficulty of finding all of these children given the fact that
records of such activities are scarce. But again, it is worth highlight that the state of
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Argentina like that of Chile has the capacity and the resources to provide compensation to
many victims who suffered from the dictatorship.
In 2004 the Argentine government provided $3 billion USD in reparations for
those individuals that were detained without a trial from 1976-1979.76 The programs in
general have had some success in bringing some reparations to the country. But in
Argentina what do these reparations mean? Nora Sveaass and Ann Sønneland led
interviews in Argentina with individuals who were either victims or were family
members of victims. From their interviews, they gathered what was discussed earlier,
reparations were seen as a form of recognition of the atrocities77. Additionally, they point
out that those interviewed made it clear that they thought of the reparations as
compensation for their suffering but not as a form of compensation for their loss because
they held that their loss was not something that could be quantified. Additionally, the
authors point to the result that following the lifting of amnesty and the prosecution of all
the individuals that were involved in the repression during the Dirty Way changed the
way in which victims saw reparations. Some of the respondents held that the system of
reparations was unjust, a view that they held particularly strong when impunity remained
as many perpetuators weren’t being brought to justice. They thought that the state was
trying to buy their silence and compliance78.
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¡Nunca Más!
Following the publishing of the report, also referred to as ¡Nunca Más!, the
President of Argentina would seek to bring the military leaders of the dictatorships in
what would be known as the “Trials of the Juntas.” Additionally, the findings from the
report were used in order to prosecute the leaders of the military junta with 711 cases
from the commission report being used in the prosecution of the junta.79 Nine individuals
were brought to trial during the Trials of the Juntas of which two would be sentenced to
life imprisonment, while three would receive lesser sentences and four would be
acquitted. Though early in his time in office President Alfonsin sought the repeal of
amnesty laws it was not until 2003 that the laws were repealed. In addition, the state
under Kirchner made an exception to the statute of limitations to allow victims to bring
cases before the courts in order for them to seek justice. Furthermore, in an attempt to
stress the results of the commission President Alfonsin sponsored a documentary that
summarized some of the results of the report. The legitimacy of the report of the
commission was called into question but was legitimized later by another commission
that reached many of the same conclusions. The Peronist party created bicameral
commissions to essentially do the same thing that the original commission report had.80
The ¡Nunca Más! found that about 9,000 individuals disappeared during the 7
years of military dictatorship. However, numerous human rights groups believe that this
is a very low representation of the actual numbers, and the commission acknowledged
this when it suggested that the real number may up to 30,000 but that not everyone came
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forward out of fear. In Argentine society, some individuals still dispute the number of
victims but human rights groups tend to use the number 30,000. But this points to a larger
problem in Argentine society, the failure to acknowledge the atrocities that the regimes
brought. As mentioned before, the report found that many perpetuators in interviews still
firmly believed in that their actions were justified because it was a just cause. Meanwhile
others do not acknowledge what the report published. But the state has tried to combat
this through an incorporation of discussions within the classrooms. Additionally,
Argentina has adopted reforms such as raising international treatises ratified by
government to the status of constitutional law81. This step by the government of
Argentina represents a positive change that shows commitment to upholding international
law and human rights standards. Individuals, however, must remain vigilant in order to
ensure that the state does not falter on its commitment. Human rights groups play an
important role in keeping the pressure on the government to deliver on its promises. One
said group is the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo.
The Madres de la Plaza de Mayo is an organization that was created during the
years of military dictatorship by mothers who were looking for their children that had
been forcefully disappeared. Las Madres de a Plaza de Mayo to this day march in front of
the Casa Rosada in the capital of Buenos Aires on Thursdays at 3:30 pm. They hold the
pictures of their loved ones lost and read out names of those who are still missing. The
state of Argentina has taken many steps to bring about change and turn the chapter on
their dark history.
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Chapter 5: Conclusions
When we compare and contrast the different truth commissions previously
mentioned there are many factors that must be kept in mind. Firstly, we must
acknowledge the different political circumstances under which these commissions were
started. Additionally, it is important to understand the social context of the countries at
the time of the truth commissions were started. But with these in factors in mind we can
still seem some commonalities across the cases that are worth noting.
First of all, it is important to note that none of the commissions engaged in
directly naming the perpetuators of the injustices beyond those that may have been
obvious. Most of the reports seem to make general statements and some are more passive
in criticizing the role of the government in the injustices. However, this was necessary in
order to prevent political backlash in all of the countries, countries trying to come to
terms as to what had just occurred. We see that in Guatemala the commission was tasked
with investigating crimes during a series of dictatorships plagued by a civil war, thus
being perceived as impartial for legitimacy was crucial. In Argentina, the government had
violently repressed actors that were perceived as internal enemies in what the Argentine
military attempted to describe as a civil war but was far from. Meanwhile the truth
commission in Chile attempted to establish the truth somewhat limited by the fact that the
military commanders of the dictatorship continue to hold power over their branches. All
of the commissions sought to establish the truth, but their ability to use the truth to
achieve justice was determined by the influence of the perpetuators in power. In
Guatemala, the fact that the Historical Clarification Commission was established as part
of the peace agreements that marked the end of the civil war meant that many
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perpetuators continue to hold power and so trying to bring them to justice would be
nearly impossible. Chile did not see cases against the most serious offenders, such as
Pinochet, begin until nearly a decade later. Argentina had the most success in bringing its
regime to justive because most the military had ceded power in the transition to the
democratically elected president Alfonsin following its defeat in the war over the
Falkland Islands to the United Kingdom. The military junta thought that they would be
safe from prosecution given that they passed amnesty laws before they ceded power but
that amnesty was removed nearly two decades later by the courts. Though Alfonsin
brought the military leaders to court almost immediately bringing the individual
perpetuators to justice took several years. However, the truth commissions work was
invaluable, and has proven crucial in the cases brought by victims essentially the truth
commissions are only as powerful as the government that commissions them.
In the case of Guatemala, the commission proved to be novel and powerful by its
decision to classify the violence against indigenous populations as genocide. However,
the Guatemalan government following the peace negotiations failed to pass laws to fairly
compensate the victims and to punish the aggressors mostly because it continued to be
fractured. 36 years of civil war and genocide cannot be fixed with the truth. Even justice
cannot right all of the wrongs but justice for the victims must be a priority for the
governments. Justice must come in the form of reparations and in the form of trials
against those who are responsible. Reparations are a form of recognition of the state for
the harms they have inflicted upon a population and are necessary not to make up for
what was done but to help alleviate some of the burdens that resulted from said harm.
Truth commissions are about the state acknowledging what has happened, but also about
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the state helping families of victims get closure and ensuring that everyone remembers
what happened, rather than try gloss over the dark period in their history.
Truth commissions in the three countries have helped provide closure to some
families while helping others get closer. In the case of forcefully disappeared individuals’
families have either been able to find their loved ones or know that that they might have
been victims of the state. The military in Argentina would destroy records that it did keep
and would engage in campaigns of misinformation. Within a country the government has
a greater ability to control the information that the general public has access to, and that’s
exactly what the states did. They engaged in legitimizing their actions as actions
necessary to combat the internal enemy and many people believed the state. Many
people, as evidenced in the Argentine testimonies, truly believed, believe that what they
did was just and necessary.
Denial and indifference by citizens in the face of atrocities is actually a welldocumented phenomenon within the academia of psychology. The states of Chile,
Guatemala, and Argentina sought to control the flow of information and had the power in
misconstruing information. In most of the states the repression of individuals was
justified for patriotic reasons. As Sutton and Norgaard point out, Argentina and the
military dictatorship characterized the leftist organizations as enemies of the state
engaged in subversion.82 This most closely explains why some perpetuators of violence
did not feel remorse in the post-dictatorship. And though the countries won’t be able to
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deal with all of the deniers, won’t be able to change everyone’s mind the report can be
used as proof and as a legitimate source of information for future generations. But most
importantly it is important that everyone have access to the knowledge of what the
government did and the ways in which it may have happened, with or without their
knowledge. Though the publication of the reports did have some initial backlash in Chile
where vigilante justice seemed to rise with the publication of the report, we can mostly
argue that the reason for this vigilante justice was the impunity with which the state acted
towards the aggressors. We see that in Argentina there was little backlash because the
president seemed committed justice as evidenced by the prosecution of the junta military.
Also, we must consider that in Chile discussion regarding the report was weak because of
the distraction of the public with the violence that seemed to follow the report.
Meanwhile in Guatemala, though there was public outcry against the government, the
transitional government formed through peace negotiations weren’t as receptive to the
demands of the public. Additionally, the granting of amnesty and the continued
participation of perpetuators of violence within the Guatemalan government also hurt the
discussions regarding the commission’s findings. But within these processes of
restoration of justice and democracy and the rule of law all individuals must remain
vigilant.
Sonia Cardenas points out that during the dictatorship of Pinochet, the
government defended human rights as something fundamental to Chilean democracy yet
we observed some of the most egregious violations within the same government83.
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Additionally, Cardenas gives the example of Argentina that under the military
dictatorship also seemed committed to uphold human rights it did not translate into
anything. Ultimately, governments will justify their violations of human rights through
different rhetorical means and that was consistent through the cases of Chile, Argentina,
and Guatemala. In all of the countries the victims were enemies of the state and in some
of them, out of fear people believed that they must have done something to be targeted.
The atmosphere of fear created by the repression can also explain some of the limited
successes of the governments bringing about change through the use of the truth
commission.
Sikkink argues that in Guatemala repression was so severe that it eliminated or
silenced the human rights movement”.84 Meanwhile in Chile and Argentina, not many
individuals died as a direct result of massacres but rather Chilean and Argentinian
citizens lived in fear of being forcefully disappeared. The scorched earth policy
implemented by the Guatemalan armed forces was extremely harmful because those most
likely to speak out were murdered. But the truth commissions gave individuals an
opportunity they had not been given before. They were given a space to share their
experiences, stories, their petitions for loved ones and someone was finally willing to
listen.
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All of the reports mentioned the need to try to find as many victims as possible
regardless if they lived in urban or rural settings. For many people, the truth commissions
were necessary to feel heard to feel like someone actually cared about what had happened
to their loved ones. It would seem commissions in this respect have been able to achieve
something very important beyond establishing the truth. However, though it is important
for these individuals to be heard they will also tell you that seeking justice is equally
important. All three of the commissions had very similar recommendations which
revolved around the need for reparations and the need to ensure that it did not happen
again. We see that more important than the stated goals of a truth commission, is the
ability of the governments to commit to implementing the recommendations in an
effective manner. Acknowledgement of past atrocities, whether through the findings of
the truth commission or through the reparations that they recommend are not enough to
achieve justice.
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